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*   *   * 
 
Appearing, in some aspects, to be part of a maritime region linked by waterborne 
traffic, all the while playing the role of a frontier between China and Southeast 
Asia, Vietnam has undoubtedly shared in a common Southeast Asian culture. 
Linguistic borrowings, such as the use of the word cù-lao for island, a 
Vietnamization of the Malay term pulau imply that a certain amount of 
permeability to Southeast Asian cultural influence has always existed. 
Nevertheless, such common Southeast Asian elements generally do not outweigh 
the factors which link Vietnam to China. Chinese cultural models have remained 
synonymous with ‗civilization‘ as Vietnamese literati never ceased to define 
Vietnamese culture so as to distinguish it clearly from that of their Southeast 
Asian neighbors, endeavoring persistently to increase popular awareness of 
Confucian norms and to deepen the association between Vietnamese ethnicity 
and Confucianism. 
 This cultural alignment notwithstanding, Vietnamese scholars in the past 
tended to stress considerably the important role of their country as an 
intermediary in technology transfers between China and Southeast Asia. The 
diffusion of plants is a good example. The introduction of many species is clear 
in several sources. In his encyclopaedic work Vân Đài Loại Ngû (Classified 
Topics from the Yun Library; 1773), Lê Quý Đôn (1726-1784) told his readers 
that, among diverse food crops, maize had been brought to Vietnam from China 
by Phùng Khắc Khoan when the latter was sent as an ambassador to Peking in the 
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sixteenth century.1 One of the results of this was that when the diplomat returned 
to his home province of Sơn-tây, he introduced the new grain to farmers there. 
Soon after, maize replaced rice throughout the area. However, Lê Quý Đôn also 
stated categorically that the material produce of Vietnam was superior to China‘s 
in everything from flowers and fruits to vegetables. He traced Vietnam‘s sugar 
crop back to seventh-century south India and Vietnam‘s method of boiling rice 
wine back to the medieval Thai. Further, he stated that ―people from Laos― had 
brought tobacco plants to Vietnam for the first time around 1600. Above all, he 
pointed out that three types of short term or early ripening rice, known 
respectively as ―sixty days rice,‖ ―eighty days rice,‖ and ―hundred days rice,‖ all 
of which originated in Champa had been first transmitted to Vietnam and only 
later to China. As Alexander Woodside has suggested, by making the 
international spread of Cham rice in the eleventh century into a major theme for 
Vietnamese readers some seven centuries later, ―Lê Quý Đôn was inviting them 
to re-imagine the whole economic field of the South China Sea away from China 
and in favour of Indochina.‖2 It is evident that Lê Quý Đôn‘s aim was not only to 
shrink the importance of China but also to make the data from regional 
agricultural growth impart a far more multi-dimensional consciousness of 
Vietnamese identity. As a matter of fact, other known botanical introductions 
received less attention from the governing elite. This was certainly the case for 
the green peas introduced by the Dutch (the Vietnamese term for them can be 
directly translated as Dutch Beans) or the mangosteen tree imported to Cochin-
china from the Sunda Islands by the French missionary Pierre Pigneaux.3 
 Conversely, the Chinese occasionally acknowledged the artfulness of 
Vietnamese craftsmen. Thus, in 1282 the Yuan emperor demanded that Vietnam 
send tribute consisting of skillful artisans, two individuals for each branch of 
crafts,4 and Vietnamese builders were requisitioned in 1416 to take part in the 
construction of palaces in the Ming capital.5 The Chinese were also interested in 
Vietnamese skills in the manufacture of firearms. During the Ming occupation of 
Vietnam, 1407-1424, the Chinese took Vietnamese weapons specialists back to 
China to fabricate firearms. Indeed the Ming chronicles report that during their 
occupation of Vietnam the Chinese acquired some artillery techniques from the 
                                                 
1 Lê Quý Đôn. Vân Đài Loại Ngû (Classified Topics from the Yun Library; 1773), 
(Hà Nội: Văn Hóa, 1961), vol. 2, 178 ff. 
2 Alexander Woodside, ―The Relationship between Political Theory and Economic 
Growth in Vietnam, 750-1840,‖ in Anthony Reid ed., The Last Stand of Asian 
Autonomies. Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast Asia and Korea, 
1750-1900 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997), 256-257. 
3  Louis Malleret, ―Note sur l‗introduction du mangoustanier en Cochinchine,‖ 
Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises 7, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1932), 89-93. 
4 Khâm Định Việt Sử Thông Giám Cương Mục (Complete Mirror of Viet History) 
(Hà Nội: Giáo Dục, 1998), trans. Viện Sử Học, vol. 1, 509. 
5 Ibid., 757. 
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Vietnamese, probably a reference to several types of fire lances which were 
initially developed in Vietnam.6 Even high ranking Vietnamese prisoners were 
well treated by the Ming if they had knowledge of production techniques for 
firearms.7 
 The Vietnamese craftsmen‘s manual dexterity, skill, and perseverance were 
favorable traits for the development of technology. They managed to obtain 
important achievements through very simple means and extraordinary patience. 
Great adapters rather than creative artists they were capable of imitating very 
closely the most curious things ever fabricated provided they could have the 
proper materials. In his Phủ Biên Tạp Lục (Frontier Chronicles; 1776) Lê Quý 
Đôn spoke admiringly of the family members of an artisan, Nguyễn Văn Tú, 
working for the Nguyễn Lords who had been a student of the Dutch. Apparently 
they were all capable of manufacturing very sophisticated cog-wheeled clocks 
and telescopes.8 
 But again, there remained a constant desire to instill a national character in 
these foreign techniques. This tendency represented a special intellectual trait 
within Vietnamese culture. In spite of their deep Sinicization, the Vietnamese 
retained a sharp and critical sense even towards their Chinese initiators. In the 
domain of therapeutics for example, they did not accept all the Chinese theories 
or courses of treatment. Instead they modified them considerably, taking into 
account local botanical and mineral resources that they considered well adapted 
to the pathology of their own people (hence the numerous treatises on the 
ingredients of medicinal preparations). 9  In so doing they emphasized the 
antagonism between northern (thuốc bắc) and southern (thuốc nam) medicine.10 
                                                 
6 Ming Shilu, as quoted by Geoff Wade in ―The Ming Shi-lu (Veritable Records of 
the Ming Dynasty) as a Source for Southeast Asian History―Fourteenth to Seventeenth 
Centuries,‖ Ph.D. diss., University of Hong Kong, 1994, vol.1, 349. 
7 Hồ Nguyên Trừng, son of Hồ Quý Ly, the Vietnamese leader against the Ming 
forces, received special treatment from the Ming emperor after he was brought to China as 
a prisoner, because he was well versed in the production of firearms. Khâm Định Việt Sử 
Thông Giám Cương Mục, vol.1, 735. 
8 Lê Quý Đôn, Lê Quý Đôn Toàn (Lê Quý Đôn‘s Complete Works),  Tập. I: Phủ Biên 
Tạp Lục (Frontier Chronicles) (Hà Nội: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1977), 328-329. 
9 The medicinal herbarium compiled in the fifteenth century by the historian Phan 
Phu Tiên, Bảo Thực Vật Toản Yếu (An Essential Materia Medica), was apparently the 
first of these Sino-Vietnamese treatises listing available medicinal stuffs. In the eighteenth 
century, 1717, the fundamental work Nam Dược Thần Hiệu (Southern Medicine of 
Divine Efficacy) appeared. The work‘s author, the monk Tuệ Tĩnh, is considered to be the 
patron deity of Vietnamese medicine. 
10  Claudia Michele Thompson has thoroughly analyzed the difference between 
Chinese and Vietnamese traditional medical theory from the particular viewpoint of 
smallpox in her study ―A Negotiated Dichotomy: Vietnamese Medicine and the 
Intersection of Vietnamese Acceptance of and Resistance to Chinese Cultural Influence,‖ 
Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1998. For a general survey see Dương Bá Bành, 
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 The fact is that, in traditional Vietnamese pre-mechanical techniques, the 
individual factor, the part of the maker, was crucial. The causes of failure were 
poorly understood and unpredictable, since they could not be related to any 
scientific explanation or scientific concept. Under these conditions, it is 
conceivable that a technique could comprise, on the one hand, an objectively 
effective aspect, of empirical origin, and on the other, a magical aspect, in 
practice ineffectual but to which the craftsman might sometimes attach very great 
importance, to the point of endowing the instruments of his activities with a soul. 
This corresponded to the belief which held weaponry to be invested with sacred 
energies that could be summoned in battle. Recognizing the spiritual nature of 
firearms as being in keeping with this perception of the inter-relationship between 
the material and spiritual spheres of life, Vietnamese rulers followed the ritual 
practiced elsewhere in Southeast Asia of harnessing the spiritual powers of these 
weapons for the benefit of their kingdom. Hence the practice of accumulating 
large numbers of decorative but unusable guns, and the tendency to venerate 
certain cannon as potent genie. William Dampier, an English traveler, who 
visited Hanoi toward the end of the seventeenth century, saw a cannon placed in 
front of the palace of the Lord Trinh Côn to serve as the supernatural protector of 
the kingdom. In 1826 Emperor Minh-Mạng had a temple for the Genie of Fire 
Guns built in Huế. On that occasion the emperor proclaimed a very revealing 
edict:  
 
Cannon are of vital importance in warfare, and their power 
arises from a terrible spirit. However no cult has been 
rendered to it up to now. We therefore order relevant 
officials to choose a suitable place and to erect a temple 
where this spirit will be worshipped properly at designated 
times. We further deliver to this spirit the title of Genius of 
the Fire Guns endowed with supernatural powers and full of 
majesty, who protects from far.11 
 
Since a spiritual end was assigned to each achievement, military art was 
particularly closely linked to geomancy, be it fortifications, tactics and strategy, 
territorial conquests or pitched battles. The adoption in the early nineteenth 
century of Vauban-type plans for citadels would not preclude the combination of 
                                                                                                              
―Panorama médical du Viêtnam d‗autrefois,‖ Bulletin de la Société des Études 
Indochinoises 26, no. 3 (1951), 339-355; Pierre Huard and Maurice Durand, ―Lãn Ông et 
la médicine sino-vietnamienne,‖ Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises 28, no. 3 
(1953), 221-293; Nguyễn Trần Huân, ―La médecine vietnamienne au XVIII siècle. Texte 
original de Phạm Đình Hồ extrait du «Vũ Trung Tủy Bút»,‖ Bulletin de l‘École Française 
d‘Extrême-Orient 60 (1973), 375-384, and ―La médecine traditionnelle,‖ Études 
Vietnamiennes 50, 1977. 
11  Cf. Léopold Cadière, ―Le culte des armes à feu,‖ in Croyances et pratiques 
religieuses des Vietnamiens (Paris: EFEO, 1992), vol. 2, 191-197. 
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Western conceptions with those of geomancers and the preservation of the old 
Chinese quadrangular or pentagonal earth ramparts. 
 As for the Vietnamese bureaucracy, generalist by tradition, it was considered 
to be based on the concept that the morally cultivated Confucian ―superior man‖ 
was preferable as an official to the man who merely commanded technical or 
administrative expertise. His motives and manners would be irreproachable and 
he could thus provide an example of proper behavior to subordinates and to the 
people. And yet, to repeat Alexander Woodside‘s expression, the Vietnamese 
scholar class needed a sort of epistemological sovereignty within the Vietnamese 
political system. 12  Therefore, they tended to defend their position not just 
through their claim to exemplify Confucian virtue, but by practical all-
knowingness specifically in the matter of how to acquire empirical knowledge 
rather than purely moral knowledge. From that point of view, since traveling was 
deemed a way to increase knowledge, travelogues were regarded as a means of 
learning about oneself, about one‘s own country and about neighboring nations. 
This was the reason for Lê Quý Đôn to write, in the preface of his Notes on 
Things Seen and Heard (1777): Wherever my steps brought me, I applied myself 
to investigating and inquiring, and whatever I saw or heard, I made notes and 
wrote short appreciations, then gave my notes to my page to put aside in my bag 
of documents.13  And, bound to write detailed reports on what they saw and 
experienced, envoys sent abroad, especially in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, were understandably very keen on giving informative records of their 
mission.14 
                                                 
12  Alexander Woodside, ―Central Viet Nam‘s Trading World in the Eighteenth 
Century as seen in Lê Quý Đôn‘s Frontier Chronicles,‖ in K.W. Taylor and John K. 
Whitmore eds., Essays into Vietnamese Pasts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 
171. 
13 Lê Quý Đôn. Lê Quý Đôn Toàn (Lê Quý Đôn‘s Complete Works), Tập. II, Kiến 
Văn Tiểu Lục (Notes on Things Seen and Heard) (Hà Nội: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1977), 14. 
14 These reports were officially known as ―daily chronicles of the progress of the 
embassies‖ (Sứ trình nhật ký). As examples see, Phan Huy Lê, Claudine Salmon, and Tạ 
Trọng Hiệp, Un emissaire vietnamien à Batavia: Phan Huy Chú, Héi trinh chi lược, 
‘Recit sommaire d‘un voyage en mer’ (1833), Cahier d‘Archipel 25 (1994), viii-228; 
Chen Ching-ho, ―Les missions officielles dans les Ha châu ou ‗Contrées méridionales‘ de 
la première période des Nguyên,― Bulletin de l‘École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 81 
(1994), 101-124; Claudine Salmon and Ta Trong Hiêp, ―L‗emissaire vietnamien Cao Bá 
Quát (1809-1854) et sa prise de conscience dans les ‗Contrées méridionales,‘‖ Bulletin de 
l‘École Française d’Extrême-Orient 81 (1994), 125-149; Tạ Trọng Hiệp, ―Le journal de 
l‗ambassade de Phan Thanh Gian en France (4 juillet 1863-18 avril 1864),‖ in Claudine 
Salmon ed., Récits de voyage des Asiatiques. Genres, mentalités, conception de l‘espace 
(Paris: EFEO, 1996), 335-365; Claudine Salmon, ―Bengal as Reflected in Two South-
East Asian Travelogues from the Early Nineteenth Century,‖ in Om Prakesh and Denys 
Lombard eds., Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1800 (New Delhi: 
Manohar, 1999), 383-402. 
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 Such a state of mind helps to explain this willingness to select new ideas from 
the outside world and to adapt them within an accepted cultural framework. This 
is well illustrated in the effective response towards new technological advances, 
particularly in the field of the manufacture of ships and guns. It is generally 
considered that, if the Vietnamese are to be credited with independence of 
conception, inventiveness in research and the creation of a prototype, then those 
qualities were to be found in their skills in the art of shipbuilding.15 As the 
Vietnamese coastline is one of those most swept and affected by typhoons, the 
local population of seafarers has naturally developed an acute sense of 
observation combined with long experience of the local waters. These seafarers 
had the originality to combine harmoniously different influences, Indian, 
Indonesian, and Chinese, to manufacture water craft that were often more 
maneuverable than those they were modeled on.16 Vietnamese boats had fine 
nautical qualities even if the practice of caulking and metallic joining was not 
applied to them. In particular, the traditional assemblage technique of 
Vietnamese shipwrights, which made use mostly of pegs of special wood that 
fastened wooden and/or iron parts together without allowing corrosion was most 
ingenious. Foreign observers were unanimous in appreciating the worth of 
Vietnamese boats and sailors. Their opinions are perhaps best exemplified in the 
narrative of the envoy of the Governor General of India to Vietnam in the early 
nineteenth century, John Crawfurd: 
 
I know of no people of the East so well fitted to make expert 
mariners from their hardiness, their activity and their prompt 
and cheerful habits of obedience. The Cochin Chinese, 
altho‘ not permitted to go abroad, conduct a considerable 
traffic by sea between one part of the Empire and another. In 
the course of this, as well as in the transporting of the 
tributes to the capital, they acquire a good deal of maritime 
experience. Their vessels, it has been remarked by good 
judges, are the best description of native craft anywhere to 
be seen in India, and fit to encounter without danger the 
worst weather.17 
 
After having been appraised of the advantages of Western ships the Vietnamese 
did not hesitate to borrow construction details from Europeans. Indeed local 
shipwrights soon proved capable of building European-type ships. However, for 
                                                 
15 J. B. Piétri, Voiliers d‘Indochine (Saigon: S.I.L.I., 1949), 5. 
16 For a description of several different shipbuilding construction techniques, see P. 
Paris, ―Esquisse d‗une ethnographie navale des pays annamites,‖ Bulletin des Amis du 
Vieux Huê (Oct.-Dec 1942), 351-450. See also Piétri, passim. 
17 John Crawfurd as quoted in Alastair Lamb, The Mandarin Road to Old Huê: 
Narrative of Anglo-Vietnamese Diplomacy for the 17th Century to the Eve of the French 
Conquest (London: Archon Books, 1970), 263-264. 
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a long time they would continue to prefer their own small, light, speedy vessels 
which could be adapted for either trade or war. Thus, in the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, the Trịnh Lords in northern Vietnam had 500 large junks 
each carrying at least three cannon. Those vessels were regarded by some 
missionaries as the equal of any European ship in Asian waters at the time. 
 Naturally, the nearly unending state of civil war in Vietnam encouraged the 
production and use of firearms on a relatively large scale. During the whole of 
the seventeenth century the warring Vietnamese lords bought cannon, saltpeter, 
sulfur, lead and cannonballs from the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the Spanish. 
Further, by recovering guns from Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch shipwrecks, 
and by employing European gunsmiths, the Vietnamese came to learn about the 
latest European developments. They then applied this knowledge in their own 
foundries. A Portuguese of mixed blood, João da Cruz, offered his services to the 
Nguyễn Lords in southern Vietnam and established a foundry in Huế to build 
guns in the European way.18 
 Two centuries later, in 1822, John Crawfurd could still appraise the quality of 
some of the pieces cast by João da Cruz: 
 
The art of casting good brass cannon, under the direction of 
Europeans, appears to have been long known in this part of 
the world, for among the cannon in the arsenal were a good 
number of very well founded ordnance, apparently of the 
size of long nine-pounders, as old as the years 1664 and 
1665. These had an inscription in the Portuguese language, 
importing that they were cast in Cochin China, and bearing 
the dates in question, with the name of the artist. Although 
very inferior indeed to those recently cast under the 
direction of the French, still they were very good specimens 
of workmanship.19 
 
The Vietnamese quickly used their own considerable skills to apply the new 
techniques in casting for their own purposes. Indeed they cast two bells of 230 
kilograms for the Christian churches in Ayutthaya. When they asked the English 
to send a gun founder in 1678, it was not to learn about founding but to assess 
European techniques. They were also able to recognize quality workmanship, or 
the lack of it, in arms they purchased. In 1689 the Nguyễn Lord refused to accept 
                                                 
18 Léopold Cadière, ―Le quartier des Arenes. I: Jean de la Croix et les premiers 
Jésuites,‖ Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Huê (1924), 307-332; H. Le Breton, ―Le vieux An 
Tinh: I. Vieux canons en bronze et en fonte,‖ Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Huê (1934), 
181-197. 
19 John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the 
Courts of Siam and Cochin China Exhibiting a View of the Actual State of those 
Kingdoms (London, 1828), 253. 
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two defective cannon from the English.  Yet another time only seven of twenty 
cannon sent by the English were deemed to be of acceptable quality.20  
 The Vietnamese manufacturing process for small arms as well as cannon must 
have improved with time since the English East India Company‘s envoy to 
Cochin China, Charles Chapman, attested to the high standards of Cochinchinese 
gunsmiths in these terms: 
 
Some soldiers were employed in shooting at a bull with long 
matchlocks which had swivels and three-legged stands to 
fire them on. The workmanship of these pieces was as good 
as any I have seen of the kind in Hindostan. The Viceroy 
acquainted me they had been fabricated under his own 
inspection.21 
 
Aside from the manufacture of arms the troops of all sides in the Vietnamese 
civil war exhibited a high level of skill in their use. In the war between the 
Nguyễn and the Trịnh the proficiency of the Cochinchinese in handling both 
cannon and harquebus was observed in 1631 by a Jesuit missionary: 
 
The Cochin Chinese have now become so expert in the 
managing of them [artillery and harquebus] that they surpass 
our Europeans; for indeed they did little else every day but 
exercise themselves in shooting at a mark. They are so good 
they could hit with the artillery better than others would with 
a harquebus. And with harquebus, too, they are good. They 
go daily to the fields to practise.22 
 
For their field artillery the southern Vietnamese relied on small cannon which 
could be borne on the backs of soldiers and could fire a four-ounce (112-gram) 
shot. The Trịnh Lords in northern Vietnam kept ready a force of seventy or 
eighty thousand men, armed with swords or thick, heavy matchlocks with barrels 
of 1 to 1.2 meters in length. These men were considered, by observers of the 
time, to be among the quickest of any nation in loading and firing their arms. The 
armory of the Trịnh Lords in the seventeenth century contained some fifty to 
sixty major iron guns from falcons to demi-culverins along with two or three full 
size culverins and some iron mortars. Around the Nguyễn court in the south were 
around 1,200 bronze cannon of different calibers. Some bore the Spanish or the 
                                                 
20  Leonard Y. Andaya, ―Interactions with the Outside World and Adaptation in 
Southeast Asian Society, 1500-1800,‖ in Nicholas Tarling ed., The Cambridge History of 
Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), vol. 1, 383. 
21 Charles Chapman as quoted in Lamb, 112. 
22  As quoted in C. R. Boxer, ―Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the 
Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill,‖ Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 38, no. 2 (1965), 166. 
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Portuguese coat of arms while others, most likely of local manufacture, were 
beautifully crafted in the form of dragons, spinxes, and leopards.23 
 By the middle of the eighteenth century firearms and other gunpowder 
weapons had become a permanent part of Vietnamese warfare. When the Tây-
Sơn forces routed the Chinese army sent to aid the Lê Emperor in 1789 their 
leader, Nguyễn Huệ, has been described as entering Thăng-Long (present day Hà 
Nội) with ―his armor black from the smoke of gunpowder.‖24 Mines also killed 
many fleeing Chinese, a fact which demonstrates that the Vietnamese were 
familiar with their use. Nguyễn Huệ paid a great deal of attention to 
strengthening his armed forces. He equipped them with several new weapons, 
including muskets, various types of cannon, and flame throwers. He also had 
large warships capable of transporting many elephants, cannon, and six to seven 
hundred troops. However, publicly at least, he exhibited nothing but contempt for 
western military technology. As he stated in one of his last proclamations: 
 
You must not be so credulous as to believe in all the 
Westerners‘ boasts. What are they worth? They all have blue 
eyes like those of snakes and you must regard them as 
corpses washed ashore by the North Sea waves. There is 
nothing that you can tell me about their brass clad ships and 
their balloons.25 
 
This apparently disdainful declaration denoted, in reality, a certain resentment, 
not to say a feeling of powerlessness, at a time when Western intervention was 
beginning to be a decisive factor in the situation. Indeed, when, in 1778, Charles 
Chapman, the British East India Company‘s envoy, was received near Qui Nhon 
by Nguyễn Huệ‘s older brother, Nguyễn Nhạc, he was informed by the latter of 
―his desire of having some person sent to him capable of instructing his subjects 
in the military science.‖26 Chapman said of Nguyễn Nhạc‘s land force that it was 
―very inconsiderable and so deficient in the art military that I may safely aver a 
hundred disciplined men would rout his whole army. His marine force, consisting 
of a few galleys and three or four junks seized from the Chinese, is almost as 
despicable.‖27 By the time of Chapman‘s visit Southeast Asian gun founders 
                                                 
23  See J. Burnay, ―A propos des inscriptions portugaises de deux canons 
cochinchinois conservés au Ministère de la Guerre à Bangkok,‖ Bulletin de l‘École 
Française d‘Extrême-Orient 32 (1932), 437-440. 
24 Charles B. Maybon, Histoire moderne du pays d‘Annam (1592-1820). Étude sur 
les premiers rapports des Européens et de Annamites de la Dynastie Annamite des 
Nguyên (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1919), 298. 
25 As quoted in Lịch Sử Việt Nam (History of Viet Nam), vol. 1 (Hà Nội: Khoa Học 
Xã Hội, 1971), 367. 
26 Charles Chapman as quoted in Lamb, 100. 
27 Ibid., 101-102. 
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were at a considerable disadvantage in relation to European gun makers whose 
technology had surpassed all others at that point. Because of the increasingly 
complex knowledge necessary to produce sophisticated arms, it was no longer 
feasible for local rulers to depend upon captured of even hired Europeans or 
foreign Asians and expect them to reproduce guns of the same quality as those 
manufactured in Europe or in European foundries in Asia. By the eighteenth 
century Europeans had established indisputable superiority in the production of 
great quantities of dependable cast-iron cannon and light reliable flintlock 
muskets. So vast was the gap between the quality of handguns locally 
manufactured and those produced in Europe that one English observer in the 
early nineteenth century, John Crawfurd, remarked that the wheel locks and 
flintlocks were ―a complex machinery far beyond [Southeast Asian] skills.‖28 
Even while recognizing the skill of the Vietnamese in smelting and working the 
useful and precious metals, John Crawfurd also said that ―they are ignorant of 
tempering iron and steel: they are quite incapable of manufacturing an useful 
gunlock; and therefore, with all their dexterity in imitation, they depend wholly 
upon European nations for a supply of fire-arms.‖29 
 Where the absence of true expertise was most sorely evident was in the 
production of gunpowder. The mixing of gunpowder‘s ingredients to the right 
proportions of charcoal, sulfur, and saltpeter had taken years of experimentation 
by the Chinese. Yet it was Europeans who, after having adopted the successful 
formula, were able to adjust the nitrate content to provide the explosive power 
necessary for the various types of new and effective weaponry. The difficulty of 
obtaining consistent up-to-date knowledge drove Southeast Asian rulers to 
abandon local production of both firearms and gunpowder in favor of relying 
increasingly on supplies provided by Europeans.30 
 Under these conditions, Nguyễn Anh, contesting the Tây-Sơn, had the 
advantage over his adversaries of benefiting from European assistance. It is 
possible that he would have defeated his enemies without any French aid at all,31 
still there can be little doubt that the team of French advisers assembled on 
Nguyễn Anh‘s behalf by the missionary bishop Pierre Pigneaux was to a great 
                                                 
28 John Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago (Edinburgh, 1820), vol. I, 191. 
29 John Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the 
Courts of Siam and Cochin China Exhibiting a view of the Actual State of those 
Kingdoms (London, 1828), 483. 
30 Andaya, 387. 
31 Alexander Woodside considers that French aid did not constitute a decisive factor, 
indeed he asserts that ―In fact, the importance of the role of the Chaigneaus and Oliviers 
and Behaines in Vietnamese history has been grossly exaggerated...‖ Alexander Barton 
Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Vietnamese and 
Chinese Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, MA; 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1971), 16-18. 
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extent responsible for his victory.32 In terms of money, men, and materials the 
French role was small, but in terms of technical expertise it was highly 
significant. The military and naval experts recruited by Pierre Pigneaux brought 
something of European organization and equipment to Nguyễn Anh‘s army. The 
naval forces that swept the ships of the Tây-Sơn from the seas were organized 
and trained by Frenchmen. Indeed, by 1801 Nguyễn Anh‘s fleet included three 
European vessels, the Phoenix, the Eagle, and the Flying Dragon, all under the 
command of French officers. Nguyễn Anh further held around two hundred 
frigates of sixteen, fifteen, twenty and twenty-two guns; one hundred large 
galleys of between fifty and seventy oars; and five hundred small galleys of forty 
to forty-four oars. The Nguyễn naval dockyard at Hà Mật employed some 4,000 
workers and could build four hundred ton ships in ironwood on European 
patterns. 33  As for the Nguyễn land forces, French officers introduced the 
principle of fortification pioneered in France by Vauban. 34  In any case the 
modernist vision which enabled Nguyễn Anh, who shortly after became Gia 
Long, the founding emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty, to apprehend fully the 
potential of Western technology was far from being inconsequential. Berry, a 
British tradesman present in Saigon in April 1799 while working for the British 
East India Company, remarked that Nguyễn Anh possessed, 
 
uncommon talents, and one principal tendency of his 
ambition is to naval science, as proof of this he has been 
heard to say he would build ships of the line on the 
European plan. The king has got several Portuguese 
carpenters from Macao but is principal carpenter himself. He 
obtains much knowledge from the Encyclopaedia 35  and 
frequently has required of the Bishop translations of such 
parts of it and struck his attention, particularly those of naval 
architecture and fortification. His mode of building the three 
ships alluded to was by taking an old European ship to 
pieces and supplying the place of every part with new and 
                                                 
32  For details see Frédéric Mantienne, Mgr Pierre Pigneaux, évêque d‘Adran, 
digntaire de Cochinchine. Études et Documents no. 8 (Paris: Archives des Missions 
étrangères, 1999). 
33 Pierre Huard and Maurice Durand, Connaissance du Việt Nam (Hà Nội: EFEO, 
1954), 229. 
34 See Mantienne, 126-162. A number of surviving fortresses, like the great citadel at 
Thamh Hóa, bear witness to the achievement of Franco-Vietnamese military engineering 
during this period. 
35 Berry probably meant the French Encyclopédie which appeared in Paris between 
1751 and 1772 under the editorship of Denis Diderot. In any case his statement attests to 
the fact that Western publications were referred to on a frequent basis. 
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with the assistance of such observation as he himself made 
on the old during the dissection.36 
 
John White of the United States Navy, who spent three months in Saigon in the 
last year of Gia Long‘s reign (1819-1820), confirmed the Vietnamese emperor‘s 
interest in Western things. White described the long shopping list of Western 
goods which Gia Long‘s lieutenant Lê Văn Duyệt presented to him: 
 
A quantity of artillery; clothing for his troops; plates 
representing battles, naval and military; landscapes 
illustrative of European scenery; treatises on European 
legislation; histories of Europe; fire and side arms of fine 
temper and exquisite workmanship; useful and ornamental 
work in glass; literary and scientific European works 
generally, etc. ... A few days afterwards, the commissary 
came on board with official overtures from the king, 
accompanied with a large roll of papers containing 
mathematical drawings, very neatly executed, of cannon of 
various calibres and dimensions – none however heavier 
than five pounders; and a long list of the articles which he 
wished us to contract to furnish him the following year.37 
 
Perhaps the appraisal made by John Crawfurd, who visited Vietnam in 1822, 
depicts most suitably Gia Long‘s specific traits: 
 
His great merit consisted in the good sense with which he 
submitted to, and profited by, the lessons and instructions of 
his European officers; and the tact and discrimination with 
which he availed himself of their skill and knowledge. 
Through their means he acquired an useful and even 
extraordinary acquaintance both with naval and military 
tactics, and the art of fortification; and thus he was enabled 
to organize a more regular and effective military power than 
probably was ever before formed in India, with such slender 
assistance from European civilization and science. But his 
talents were far better suited to reconquer a kingdom than to 
govern it.38 
 
His success in building a centralized structure and learning from the West 
notwithstanding, near the end of his reign Gia Long seems to have been moving 
steadily towards a conservative frame of mind which rejected European ideas in 
                                                 
36 As quoted in Nguyễn Thế Anh, ―An English Memoir on Vietnam (1803),‖ Văn 
Hớa Nguyệt San (Culture Monthly) 8&9 (1965), 1371. 
37 J. White, History of a Voyage to Cochin China (Boston, 1823), 343-344. 
38 Crawfurd, Journal, 509. 
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favor of traditional Confucian principles of government. This tendency was to be 
reinforced by his successors. Historians have, as a rule, expressed harsh opinions 
about this attitude. David Marr qualifies the attention Gia Long and his son Minh 
Mạng devoted to the building of an important network of fortifications to serve as 
strong points for the army as pertaining to a ―fortress mentality [which] had long-
term implications: militarily it bred generations of Vietnamese generals who 
believed in static defense at a time when European gunnery technology was 
advancing by quantum degrees in terms of increased power, range, and 
mobility.‖39 Marr adds: 
 
Had [Gia Long and his associates] failed to grasp the 
progressive nature of events and allowed Confucian 
concepts of historical permanence and intellectual 
superiority to blind them during their prolonged exposure to 
change? ... Whatever the explanation, several decades later 
in the 1830s the situation was even more acute. Not only did 
technological and organizational advance not reach the 
troops in the field, but also in some cases eighteenth-century 
improvements previously introduced seem to have vanished 
without memory.40 
 
However, in light of the gradual loss of economic and military dominance in 
Southeast Asia to foreign groups, it was becoming apparent that the traditional 
response toward new technological advances, which consisted of selecting out 
side ideas to adapt to accepted practice, was an inadequate formula in the face of 
the threat from Europeans. Foreign progress in ship-building and firearms 
production continued to be greatly admired, but the extent to which the new 
technology was adopted depended upon perceived needs. European-rigged armed 
vessels could only be purchased by rulers, and such ships invariably assisted 
these rulers in strengthening their control. Gia Long and Minh Mạng had several 
such ships in their fleet in the early nineteenth century and, as noted previously, 
some were even captained by Europeans. The Nguyễn chronicles list precisely 
the names of the ships purchased in the 1830s to be sent to the southern seas on 
trade and information missions, for example the Phằng Bằng (Spreading Eagle), 
Thụy Long (Auspicious Dragon), and An Dương (Ocean Pacifier). In 1840 the 
Vietnamese court possessed three steamers, Yên Phi (Secure Flyer), Vân Phi 
(Flying Cloud), and Vụ Phi (Flying Vapor).41 Between 1865 and 1872, Emperor 
Tự Đức had four new steamers bought from English, French, and Prussian firms 
in Singapore, Saigon, and Hong Kong manned with foreign crews hired at quite a 
                                                 
39 David G. Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971), 23. 
40 Ibid., 24. 
41 Đại Nam Thục Lục (Veritable Records of Dai Nam), vol. 22 (Hà Nội: Khoa Học 
Xã Hội, 1969), 186. 
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high price until Vietnamese sailors could perfectly assimilate the new techniques 
required to sail and navigate these ships.42 However, the attempts of Vietnam, as 
well as those of Siam and Burma in the same period, to acquire the steamers seen 
as central to the military survival of these kingdoms were contested by the 
European powers whose key strategic advantage this challenged. Since 
Europeans were unwilling to provide Southeast Asians with the means to defy the 
military might of the west, this resulted in the beginning of a European 
technological monopoly in arms production and supply in the region. For 
Vietnam itself, the sources of strength that had helped the new dynasty at the end 
of the eighteenth century, when the European powers were distracted and divided 
by the Napoleonic Wars, seemed to have become unmanageable by the second 
half of the nineteenth. 
In any case, Vietnam‘s elite certainly did not come to view the Western threat 
from an entirely doctrinaire and ideologically conservative posture. They were in 
fact much interested in Western technology and the use that could be made of it. 
The position of the Vietnamese court on Western civilization was not at all 
tinged with static fanaticism, despite what French missionaries alleged in their 
writings. Having an imaginative mind and a keen interest in technology, Minh 
Mạng often indicated his penchant for scientific experimentation and was 
indisputably an admirer and user of Western products. For example, he had a 
Western steamship bought and copied in a Huế factory in 1838.43  By 1836 
Vietnam was purchasing English gunpowder, which court officials declared to be 
the best in the world.44 The emperor was also very much troubled about the 
inadequacies of the imperial examination system to prepare the Vietnamese elite 
for the military problems of the contemporary world. This was part of his 
reasoning for the particular attention he paid to maritime affairs and the emperor 
began, in 1823, to send regular missions to different areas of the southern seas 
(South China Sea) to gather information on foreign countries and to train 
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Vietnamese crews in long distance navigation.45 Naval warfare, he told his high 
officials in 1838, had not been properly studied or written about: ―I indeed have a 
cursory knowledge of one or two of the tactics of the Western countries, but I 
want you all to examine them and become familiar with them...and make your 
findings and calculations into books. We will order military men to study them 
day and night.‖46 Minh Mạng‘s successor, Thiệu Tri, continued to push Western 
arms on his courtiers and in 1843 he had Western muskets issued to his ministers 
and ordered them to learn how to use them.47 
Alexander Woodside has demonstrated that, compared to the Chinese court 
during the 1830s, the Vietnamese court was quite well informed about Western 
culture. It was also more receptive, through the explicit Vietnamese tradition of 
cultural borrowing, to the idea of adopted equipment, tactics, and strategies 
making up a significant portion of its technical and military strength. This was 
particularly true in those areas of Vietnamese life where there were no well-
defined Confucian prototypes of behavior to resist Western ideas and deform 
them. But Western machines could not be copied as easily as Chinese 
administrative institutions, and the traditional forms of institutional acculturation 
and transposition encouraged by the relations of the Vietnamese with the Chinese 
were, in the end, bad precedents that blocked true modernization. Apparently, it 
never dawned on the Vietnamese that it would be necessary to study the 
principles, theories, or culture on which Western science was based, instead of 
imitating the products of Western science in the same mechanical manner as their 
imitation of Chinese institutions.48 
The basic problem, however, for the Nguyễn regime was not merely the 
acquisition of Western arms or the borrowing of Western technology, but the 
reconstruction of social and political order on lines that would enable it to resist 
the pressures of Western imperialism―a problem by its very nature insoluble. 
Although the court of Huế was conscious of the need for innovation within its 
military institutions, it was also conscious of the concomitant need to reinforce 
the control of its civil bureaucracy over Vietnamese society. Thus, Emperor Tự 
Đức, reputed to have been so inflexible in his Confucianism that any thought of 
Western influenced reforms was anathema to him, manifested a lively interest in 
and familiarity with western science and technology. He read Chinese language 
newspapers from Hong Kong and occasionally organized discussions among the 
court notables on articles on technical and commercial subjects.49 However, the 
emperor often used his own knowledge of Western learning to refute those who 
urged its widespread adoption, because he believed that the French menace could 
only be defeated through a renewal of dedication to the Confucian political canon 
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on which Vietnamese social and political institutions were based. From this 
perspective, even successful resistance to French military aggression and political 
domination at the price of adopting Western ways would not solve the 
fundamental problem of protecting Vietnam‘s classical civilization from the 
subversive potential of Western culture. 
The court at Huế was not unaware of the actual international situation. 
Emissaries dispatched abroad in the 1830s, such as Lê Văn Phức and Phan Huy 
Chú, had reported quite clearly on the rivalries between European powers. These 
men had also noted the superiority of Western techniques to those of the Chinese 
world. Nevertheless, they did not seem to have been really shaken deep down 
inside themselves, although Lê Văn Phức, who clearly showed his admiration for 
British technology, was much impressed by the novelties he witnessed.50  In 
contrast, Cao Bá Quát, who was sent on a mission to Batavia in 1844, was led by 
this experience to question his own world vision. Having discovered the 
formidable western threat that was slowly swooping on the different countries of 
Asia, he could not determine how this could be averted for Vietnam. Further, his 
travel made him aware of the limits of his knowledge and he came to perceive it 
as extremely restricted faced with the immensity of the universe. Apparently he 
came to question the very foundations of Vietnamese scholars‘ knowledge and to 
hold that observation of the world and its phenomena was as important as the 
study of old books. His travels allowed him to realize the limits of the sinicized 
world and the parallel existence of a foreign world which represented a threat 
which increased with each passing day. Cao Bá Quát seems to have been 
perfectly aware of the dangers that his own country was running.51 
By and large, the Vietnamese elite had no reason, yet, for losing faith in the 
institutions that derived from the only socio-political system they had ever 
known. They were confident that a readjustment of Confucian values and 
institutions would allow Vietnamese leaders to achieve an internal transformation 
of society and an improvement of the economic and social order. Moreover, the 
reassertion of Vietnam‘s own Confucian identity was deemed to be crucial for the 
ideological cohesion of the ruling class. Nevertheless, a sharper awareness of the 
scientific and technical advance of the West led some people to think of the 
possibility of adopting practical innovations while keeping the essential values of 
Confucian culture intact. They believed that this could be achieved through the 
implementation of the Chinese Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi‘s (1130-1200) 
paired philosophical construct of substance/function. Through the application of 
this precept the ethical foundation of society, Confucian study and teaching, 
would be preserved as the substance, while elements of Western culture could be 
introduced for their usefulness and for their practical application. Those, during 
this period, among the ruling class who were ―Westernizers‖ advocated the kinds 
of reform that seemed, on the evidence available, to be the most likely to lead to 
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a strengthening of the system. An evolution towards a more technical education 
was central to the concerns of these reformers. In 1856 Phạm Phú Thứ submitted 
a memorial to the emperor calling for steamboat building to modernize the 
national economy and national defense. Some years later, 1863-1864, Phạm Phú 
Thứ‘s participation in an embassy to France gave him the opportunity to perceive 
what constituted Europe‘s strength, to express his ideas about what should be 
borrowed to improve the country, and to renew those opinions that he had 
advocated in 1856. For Phạm Phú Thứ the secret of modernization lay in a 
combination of Confucian culture and Western technology. 52  Yet another 
upholder of change, Nguyễn Trường Tộ, doggedly advocated a comprehensive 
program of reforms, including the study of the exact sciences, the publication of 
newspapers, the translation of European books, the sending of students to Europe 
for education, the recruitment of technical advisers to help in the modernization 
of agriculture, the development of mining and industry (including the armament 
industry), the construction of strategic roads and the reorganization of the 
army.53 
It is possible that, in conditions less externally threatening, this profusion of 
proposals for reform could have generated more dynamic changes. Instead the 
increasing threat from France induced a new kind of paralysis, which finally 





Andaya, Leonard Y. ―Interactions with the Outside World and Adaptation in 
Southeast Asian Society, 1500-1800.‖ In Nicholas Tarling ed., The 
Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. 
Boxer, C.R. ―Asian Potentates and European Artillery in the Sixteenth-
Eighteenth Centuries: A Footnote to Gibson-Hill.‖ Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 38, no. 2 (1965), 166. 
Burnay, J. ―A propos des inscriptions portugaises de deux canons cochinchinois 
conservés au Ministère de la Guerre à Bangkok.‖ Bulletin de l‘École 
Française d‘Extrême-Orient 32 (1932), 437-440. 
 
Cadière, Léopold. ―Le quartier des Arenes. I: Jean de la Croix et les premiers 
Jésuites.‖ Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Huê (1924), 307-332. 
                                                 
52 Ta Trong Hiêp, 359. 
53 Mark W. McLeod, ―Nguyen Truong To: A Catholic Reformer at Emperor Tu-
Duc‘s Court,‖ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25, no. 2 (Sep., 1994), 313-330. 
111 
Nguyễn Thế Anh: Ambivalence and Ambiguity 
———. ―Le culte des armes à feu.‖ In Croyances et pratiques religieuses des 
Vietnamiens. Reprint. Paris: EFEO, 1992, vol. 2, 191-197. 
Chen Ching-ho. ―Les missions officielles dans les Ha châu ou ‗Contrées 
méridionales‘ de la première période des Nguyên.‖ Bulletin de l‘École 
Française d‘Extrême-Orient 81 (1994), 101-124. 
Crawfurd, John. History of the Indian Archipelago. Vol. I. Edinburgh, 1820. 
———. Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the 
Courts of Siam and Cochin China Exhibiting a View of the Actual State of 
those Kingdoms. London, 1828. 
Đại Nam Thục Lục (Veritable Records of Dai Nam). 38 vols. Hà Nội: Khoa Học 
Xã Hội, 1962-1978. 
Dương Bá Bành. ―Panorama médical du Viêtnam d‗autrefois.‖ Bulletin de la 
Société des Études Indochinoises 26, no. 3 (1951), 339-355. 
Huard, Pierre and Maurice Durand. ―Lãn Ông et la médicine sino-vietnamienne.‖ 
Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises 28, no. 3 (1953), 221-293. 
———. Connaissance du Việt Nam. Hà Nội: EFEO, 1954. 
Khâm Định Việt Sử Thông Giám Cương Mục (Complete Mirror of Viet History). 
Transl. by Viện Sử Học. 2 vols. Hà Nội: Giáo Dục, 1998. 
Lamb, Alastair. The Mandarin Road to Old Huê: A Narrative of Anglo-
Vietnamese Diplomacy from the 17th Century to the Eve of the French 
Conquest. London: Archon Books, 1970. 
Le Breton, H. ―Le vieux An Tinh: I. Vieux canons en bronze et en fonte.‖ 
Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Huê (1934), 181-197. 
Lê Quý Đón. Vân Đài Loại Ngû (Classified Topics from the Yun Library; 1773). 
2 vols. Hà Nội: Văn Hóa, 1961. 
———. Lê Quý Đón Toàn Tập. (Lê Quý Đón‘s Complete Works); vol. I, Phủ 
Biên Tạp Lục (Frontier Chronicles); vol. II, Kiến Văn Tiểu Lục (Notes on 
Things Seen and Heard). Hà Nội: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 1977. 
Lịch Sử Việt Nam (History of Viet Nam). Vol. 1. Hà Nội: Khoa Học Xã Hội, 
1971. 
Malleret, Louis. ―Note sur l‗introduction du mangoustanier en Cochinchine.‖ 
Bulletin de la Société des Études Indochinoises 7, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1932), 
89-93. 
112 EASTM 21 (2003) 
Mantienne, Frédéric. Mgr Pierre Pigneaux, évêque d‘Adran, dignitaire de 
Cochinchine. Études et Documents no. 8. Paris: Archives des Missions 
étrangères, 1999. 
Marr, David G. Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1971. 
Maybon, Charles B. Histoire moderne du pays d‘Annam (1592-1820.) Étude sur 
les premiers rapports des Européens et de Annamites de la Dynastie 
Annamite des Nguyên. Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1919. 
McLeod, Mark W. ―Nguyen Truong To: A Catholic Reformer at Emperor Tu-
Duc‘s Court.‖ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25, no. 2 (Sept., 1994). 
Nguyễn Thế Anh. ―An English Memoir on Vietnam (1803).‖ Văn Hóa Nguyệt 
San (Culture Monthly) 8&9 (1965). 
———. Kinh tế và xã hội Việt Nam dưới các vua triểu Nguyễn (Economy and 
Society in Vietnam under the Monarchs of the Nguyễn Dynasty). Saigon: 
Lửa Thiẽng, 1970. 
———. ―Traditionalisme et réformisme à la cour de Huê dans la seconde 
moitié du XIX siècle.‖ In Histoire de l‘Asie du Sud-Est: Révoltes, réformes, 
révolutions (Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille, 1981). 
Nguyễn Trần Huân. ―La médecine vietnamienne au XVIII siècle. Texte original 
de Phạm Đình Hố extrait du «Vũ Trung Tùy Bút».‖ Bulletin de l‘École 
Française d‘Extrême-Orient 60 (1973), 375-384. 
———. ―La médecine traditionnelle. ‖ Études Vietnamiennes 50 (1977). 
Nguyễn Việt, Vũ Minh Giang, and Nguyễn Mạnh Hùng. Quân thủy trong lịch sử 
chống ngoại xâm (The Navy in the History of Resistance against Foreign 
Invasion). Hà Nội: Quân Đôi Nhân Dân, 1983. 
Paris, P. ―Esquisse d‗une ethnographie navale des pays annamites.― Bulletin des 
Amis du Vieux Huê (Oct.-Dec. 1942), 351-450. 
Phan Huy Lê, Claudine Salmon, and Tạ Trọng Hiệp. Un emissaire vietnamien à 
Batavia: Phan Huy Chú, Héi trinh chi lược, ‘Recit sommaire d‘un voyage 
en mer’ (1833). Paris, Cahier d‘Archipel 25 (1994), viii-228. 
Piétri, J. B. Voiliers d‘Indochine. Saigon: S.I.L.I., 1949. 
Salmon, Claudine. ―Bengal as Reflected in Two South-East Asian Travelogues 
from the Early Nineteenth Century.‖ In Om Prakesh and Denys Lombard 
eds., Commerce and Culture in the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1800. New Delhi: 
Manohar, 1999. 
113 
Nguyễn Thế Anh: Ambivalence and Ambiguity 
Salmon, Claudine, and Ta Trong Hiêp. ―L‗emissaire vietnamien Cao Bá Quát 
(1809-1854) et sa prise de conscience dans les ‗Contrées méridionales.‘‖ 
Bulletin de l‘École Française d‘Extrême-Orient 81 (1994), 125-149. 
Tạ Trọng Hiệp. ―Le journal de l‗ambassade de Phan Thanh Gian en France (4 
juillet 1863-18 avril 1864).‖ In Claudine Salmon ed., Récits de voyage des 
Asiatiques. Genres, mentalités, conception de l‘espace. Paris: EFEO, 1996, 
335-365. 
Thompson, Claudia Michele. ―A Negotiated Dichotomy: Vietnamese Medicine 
and the Intersection of Vietnamese Acceptance of and Resistance to 
Chinese Cultural Influence.‖ Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1998. 
Tuê Tinh 慧 靖. Nam Dược Thần Hiệu 南 藥 神 效 (Miraculous Southern 
Medicaments). 
Wade, Geoff. ―The Ming Shi-lu (Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty) as a 
Source for Southeast Asian History―Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries.‖ 
10 vols. Ph.D. diss., University of Hong Kong, 1994. 
White, J. History of a Voyage to Cochin China. Boston, 1823. 
Woodside, Alexander Barton. Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative 
Study of Vietnamese and Chinese Government in the First Half of the 
Nineteenth Century. Harvard East Asian Monographs, no. 140. Cambridge, 
MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1971. 
———. ―Vietnam, 1802-1867.‖ In David Joel Steinberg ed., In Search of 
Southeast Asia: a Modern History. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1985. 
———. ―Central Viet Nam‘s Trading World in the Eighteenth Century as seen 
in Lê Quý Đôn‘s Frontier Chronicles.‖ In K. W. Taylor and John K. 
Whitmore eds., Essays into Vietnamese Pasts. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1995. 
———. ―The Relationship between Political Theory and Economic Growth in 
Vietnam, 750-1840.‖ In Anthony Reid ed., The Last Stand of Asian 
Autonomies. Responses to Modernity in the Diverse States of Southeast 
Asia and Korea, 1750-1900. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997. 
